![]() While the Marine Corps lacks sufficient cost data to inform a valid comparison of alternatives, qualitative analysis suggests that an alternative, slightly older force may be more affordable than assumed. While lance corporals are certainly cheaper than sergeants, hidden and intangible costs of the current system are much more complex than a simple comparison of salaries. Yet, as will be demonstrated, such assertions are questionable. Senior leaders have argued that this youthful recruitand-replace model is more affordable, more physically fit, and more proficient than a more mature invest-and-retain model. Over time, the Marine Corps developed a body of cultural conventional wisdom to justify its high-turnover personnel system. ![]() Perpetuation of that paradigm, however, locked the Marine Corps into a remarkably durable process that has proved resistant to adaptation despite massive advances in technology, significant changes within American society, and mounting evidence of its inefficiency. By any measure, this system was successful at solving the perceived problems of 1985. ![]() Second, it sought to achieve uniform promotion timelines across all military occupational specialties (MOSs) by imposing pyramidshaped grade structures. First, it sought to drive down average per capita pay and benefit costs by limiting the number of Marines with greater than four years of service. The current Marine Corps enlisted management system was designed during the Reagan administration to remedy two specific concerns. ![]()
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